Negotiations with Khmelnytsky did not promise lasting peace.
he captured January. A few days later, at the Cossack council in the Sich, B. Khmelnytsky was elected hetman. It was these events that marked the beginning of the Second World War.
The Ukrainian hetman managed to reach an agreement with the Crimean Khan Islam-Girey III on a joint war against Poland. To help the rebels, the khan sent 3-4 thousand horsemen, led by Perekop Murza Tugai-bey.
At this stage of the uprising, B. Khmelnytsky and his supporters put forward only the idea of autonomy for the Cossack region. The Cossack territory in the west, in the imagination of the hetman, was to reach Bila Tserkva. During negotiations with the ambassadors of Crown Hetman Mykola Potocki, the insurgents demanded that the Polish army be withdrawn from these lands, that the “government of the Commonwealth” be abolished, and that they be given the right to conclude treaties with foreign rulers.
The military campaign of 1648 brought brilliant victories over the quartz crown army at the Battle of the Yellow Waters at the Battle of Korsun and over the noble militia at the Battle of Pylyavets.
The Battle of Pylyavets (September 11–13, 1648) was one of the outstanding battles during the Liberation War of the Ukrainian people, in which the Ukrainian army, led by Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, won a brilliant victory over the Polish nobility.
After the destruction of the Polish quartz army near Zhovti Vody and Korsun, an insurgent movement began to unfold en masse, forcing the gentry and the government of the Commonwealth to take active action. A commonwealth movement was announced (mobilization of the nobility) and a new mercenary army was recruited.
Negotiations with Khmelnytsky did not promise lasting peace. The detonator that disrupted the temporary shaky truce was the punitive actions of the magnate J. Vyshnevetsky, who in June-July carried out a punitive campaign in Volyn and Podillya. He was joined by units of nobles Tyszkiewicz, Osinsky, Zaslavsky and others.
The Polish army was concentrated at a distance of 60 km from the vanguard of the Ukrainian army, near Cholgan Stone. This army had 80-90 guns and numbered 32,000 noble militias, 8,000 German mercenaries, and 40,000-50,000 noble servants and convoys. The mood of the nobility was self-confident and frivolous. Underestimating the strength of the rebels, the gentry boasted of dispersing the “mob” with Kanchuks. The convoy was overloaded with jewelry and luxury items.
At this time, the Commonwealth was going through a painful period of interregnum. The lack of firm power was manifested, in particular, in the inability of the ruling circles to create a single command of punitive troops: at the head of the noble army were placed three regiments (commanders): indecisive and compliant Prince Dominic Zaslavsky; Mykola Ostorog, known for his scholarship, but a bad general, was a crown sergeant; proud and inflammatory young crown cornet Alexander Konetspolsky.
Khmelnytsky is credited with the following description of these Polish regiments: “featherbed, Latin and child.” The regiment members were not unanimous in their decisions and did not have authority among the army. The army lacked unity and discipline. “Every comrade wanted to be a company commander, a company commander – a colonel, a colonel – a hetman” – this is how D. Zaslavsky himself described the state of his army.
In early September, the Polish army withdrew from its base in Volhynia. B. Khmelnytsky, who was moving from Maslovy Stav through Pavoloch, Khmilnyk to Starokostiantyniv, withdrew his forces to meet him. The number of the insurgent army was 100-110 thousand people, and only 50-70 thousand were properly armed, and the rest were poorly armed Cossack peasants.
B. Khmelnytsky stopped near Pylyavets, 25 km southeast of Starokostiantyniv. He chose a favorable position for his camp – on the right bank of the river Ikva (or Pylyavka). The terrain was uneven, deep beams hindered the movement of troops. The left (opposite) bank and the adjacent territory had https://123helpme.me/write-my-lab-report/ a complex relief (hills and streams). Such terrain was unsuitable for the location of a fortified camp and did not allow the enemy to deploy its cavalry in battle order.
The Ikva River overflowed into ponds and swamps. Along the perimeter of the quadrangular camp in 6 rows were placed carts, dug trenches and embankments, on which were installed more than 100 guns. Strict discipline prevailed in Khmelnytsky’s camp. B. Khmelnytsky’s command post was set up in a small nearby Pylyavets castle. The castle stood on the elevated bank of the Ikva, and from its towers it was convenient to watch the battlefield. Above the castle was a dam, which also served as a bridge across the Ikva.
To protect the dam on the right bank, Cossack infantry settled in the trench. M. Krivonis, having brought his Cossacks out from under Starokostiantyniv, became a separate camp on the left bank of the Ikva, opposite Pylyavetsky Castle, ie on the right flank of the main forces of the Ukrainian army, continuing to perform the functions of its vanguard. K. Pivtorakozhukh’s formations became a camp on the left flank of the main forces of the Ukrainian army and covered the ford across the Ikva.
Meanwhile, Starokostiantyniv, located on the left bank of the Slucha, was defended by a Cossack garrison of 5,000 men. The Rosolovetsky crossing of the Black Way was covered by 10,000 Cossacks. The Polish side, having an advantage in the cavalry (the Crimean Tatar army was delayed by joining B. Khmelnytsky), took the initiative to start hostilities.
On September 5, the Polish-noble army crossed the Rosolovets crossing through Sluch without hindrance, and on September 6 they approached Starokostiantyniv, where they were met by the fire of a Cossack outpost. At night, the Cossack garrison suddenly left the city, which was perceived by the Poles as a sign of their weakness and insecurity.
But, as the further course of events showed, it was a strategic maneuver designed to lure the enemy into unfavorable positions. Pursuing the Cossack detachments, the Polish-noble army took up positions opposite B. Khmelnytsky’s camp. Due to the complexity of the terrain, it was not possible to organize a continuous fortified camp. Separate islands, it is chaotically spread over six hills among streams and swamps.
On September 11 (21), fighting broke out for a dam that opened access to the Khmelnytsky camp. Throwing fresh Cossack reserves into battle every time, Khmelnytsky exhausted the forces of the nobility on the Ikavian “dam”. Only by using a grueling cavalry detour and throwing several thousand men into battle were the Poles able, at the cost of considerable sacrifice, to seize the dam and create a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Ikva. The day of September 12 passed in hertz; At the same time, the Budzha Horde, numbering about 20,000 cavalry, came to join Khmelnytsky.
On September 13, Khmelnytsky led all his forces into the offensive and forced the noble detachments to fight unplanned in a place unfavorable to them. In the morning, regiments from the Khmelnytsky and Krivonos camps, as well as the Tatars, prepared for the offensive. Then the Polish army lined up for battle. One of the officers, at his own discretion, ordered several cavalrymen to attack. Because of this, all the Polish cavalry got into a chaotic battle in unfavorable positions, scattering on the beams, far from the Polish camp.
When the Polish army was in complete disarray, Khmelnytsky defeated the leading Polish positions with a strong blow and launched an attack on the Polish camp. The Cossacks captured the dam on Ikva, their regiments crossed to the left bank and began an offensive on the Polish camp. Tatar cavalry went to the flanks and rear of the enemy. During this time, a large part of the Polish cavalry, which so carelessly engaged in battle with the Cossack regiments and Tatars, scattered in various beams, valleys and swamps and was mostly surrounded and defeated. The rest of the noble army panicked.
To avoid complete defeat, the Polish command withdrew all banners from the battlefield and began to prepare for the retreat of the camp. The retreat began at night and turned into a panicked escape. The convoy was thrown at random. All artillery and large supplies of gunpowder went to the Cossacks. The winners received tens of thousands of carts, 92 guns and a large gilded and precious stone Hetman’s mace Zaslavsky. The total value of the trophies exceeded PLN 7 million.
As a result of the victory at Pylyavets, Volyn and Podillya were liberated, and Khmelnytsky’s army marched on Lviv. For the first time, the preconditions were created for the liberation of all Ukrainian lands from foreign oppression and their unification within a single independent state.
The campaign in Galicia was a demonstration of strength. The main army headed for Lviv and in early October had already attacked its suburbs. The siege lasted three weeks (October 8-26). Finally, after lengthy negotiations, Khmelnytsky was satisfied with a contribution of more than 200,000 ducats, or 1.2 million gold, most of which went to pay for Tatar services, and on October 26, issuing a decree to protect the city from unorganized Cossack troops, moved on – to Zamost. Behind him, a blind peasant war continued to rage, creating dozens of insurgent detachments and battalions in Volhynia, Galicia, and Pokut, which destroyed noble courts and killed nobles, spreading chaos and anarchy throughout Ukraine.
The Commonwealth was on the verge of a military catastrophe. The capture of Zamość would open the way for the insurgents to Warsaw, so the capital began to discuss the convening of a commonwealth movement, the temporary military leader of which the Sejm appointed Prince Yarem Vyshnevetsky. The struggle between the supporters of two contenders for the still empty throne – Jan Casimir and Karl Ferdinand, brothers of the late Vladislav IV – also entered a decisive phase. Khmelnytsky’s intervention, which unequivocally supported Jan Kazimir’s candidacy, was decisive (it is assumed that the hetman’s position was influenced by secret guarantees given to him by the prince).
During November (November 6-21) the siege of Zamost continued. To organize the struggle of the population of Belz, Volyn and Rus’ voivodships, he sent his regiments to different areas. By mid-November, they had liberated the entire western Ukrainian region with local rebel forces. Here began the formation of state institutions, in particular, the regimental-hundred territorial-administrative system.